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ABSTRACT
We are currently living in an artificial, increasingly complex created system
of discourse heavily base on socially constructed systems of language and digital
technologies. How we use these technologies to advance the human condition
in terms of our very existence makes us inherently cyborg in nature. With the
increase in digital technologies in every aspect of day –to-day existence from
your morning coffee to higher education, we have become increasingly
dependent on our cyborg identities. This thesis, then, serves as a project that
looks to understand how we have come to this point and to what extent our newly
found cyborg identities can serve as the catalyst for progress particularly in
education and the further production and transmission of human knowledge.
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CHAPTER ONE
A CYBORG POSSIBILITY

In Cyborg Citizen, Chris Hables Gray claims that:
[f]or good or ill (probably for both) the era of posthuman possibilities
is beginning. To deny it is dangerous. To recognize it is to begin to
understand, perhaps even control, our postmodern present and the
political future of our cyborg society. (12)
The cyborg as Gray describes is in this sense describes our current connection
to, and relationship with digital technologies that furthers the production and
transmission of knowledge. The cyborg is central in understanding and
envisioning a posthuman existence. Simple recognition of the cyborg, however,
is not enough. Recognition alone does not take advantage of the potential
benefit of the cyborg. Recognition alone does not help us understand the
cyborg’s place in the world. To fully realize the cyborg’s role in this “postmodern
present,” we must explore its rhetoric in relation to social power structures in this
posthuman era. Particularly, we must explore how the cyborg can work to
improve the conditions in which knowledge is created and how this we negotiate
knowledge production. In project, I attempt to explore the connection between
socially constructed power systems and the cyborg as well as the role of cyborg
rhetoric as a tool in mitigating hierarchical power structures. Specifically, I
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highlight cyborg rhetoric’s relationship with the classical Sophists and look at the
implications of that relationship for confronting existing power structures.
A cyborg rhetoric has emerged, and is actively evolving, in the current age
of the digital. Just as the technology of writing has become inseparable from
human consciousness, so too have the technologies of computerized
informational systems become so ingrained that we cannot separate our
consciousness from or deny the impact of such systems. From smarter and
smarter smart phones to the digitization of media, currency, and information in
general, the cyborg is an integral aspect of day to day existence whether we are
aware of it or not. Our ever- increasing need for and access to information drives
the evolution of the technology that makes us inherently cyborg. As with most
anything concerned with technology there should be a sense of urgency when
thinking through this idea that we are cyborgs; however, with that sense of
urgency should come a realistic admission that we have been constantly
approaching this moment for some time. What we are approaching is an entirely
unknown. There may be no ultimate destination or completion. However, we are
moving towards a profoundly different way in which we understand our humanity.
An understanding of the evolution of balance between our technology and our
humanity is in order to continue on this path in any meaningful manner.
In 1985, Donna Haraway offered the initial theorizing of the Cyborg when
she stated: “[W]e are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine
and organism; in short, we are cyborgs” (150). Her “Cyborg Manifesto” presents
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the bulk of ideological underneath the rhetoric of the cyborg. Cyborg rhetoric is
the continual discursive negotiation of the human relationship with digital
technologies to alter and resituate the traditional discourse of identity and power.
This resituating nature of cyborg rhetoric is inherently progressive and everchanging as it is intimately tied to the technology it employs. Operating without
regard for the traditional allows cyborg rhetoric to avoid simply existing as a
palimpsest of itself; its existence relies entirely on the current moment and not
the past.
Haraway states that her manifesto is an “argument for pleasure in the
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction” (150). She
claims these boundaries have been “systematic to the logics and practices of
domination” of all people “constituted as others” (177). This otherness serves as
the catalyst for understanding and defining the cyborg. The many different
instances of otherness are where the cyborg wishes to fit. Haraway defines
these as the dualism of the self/body, male/female, civilized/primitive, etc. More
specifically Haraway’s cyborg sets the stage to escape and not simply replace
these boundaries and dualisms. To do so, one must be both dominant and
subordinate; the cyborg inhabits both positions because it is created (machine)
and creator (human). Because of the cyborg’s connection to the traditional as
well as the nontraditional, its rhetoric consciously dismantles all that has
developed solely from the traditional. All the harmful dualisms, binaries, and
hierarchies become increasingly less relevant and possibly even unable to
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function in a cyborg rhetoric due to the cyborg’s ability to simultaneously embody
both sides of established dualisms and binaries.
According to Haraway’s definition, the cyborg is “a creature of social
reality as well as a creature of fiction” (149). As a creature of social reality, the
cyborg exists, and can only exist, within the same type of shifting, situational truth
that appealed to classical Sophists. In fact, Michelle Ballif calls the cyborg the
“third-sophistic” and suggests a need to shift from the lacking Aristotelian
temporal and functional definitions of rhetoric. While denying the privilege of
technê (a means of production and doing) in rhetoric, Ballif calls for an
understanding of this new rhetoric in terms of mêtis, which she defines as “a
knowing, doing, and making not in regards to Truth, but in regards to a ‘transient,
shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous’ situation” (“Third-Sophistic” 53). Rejecting
the idea of Truth suggests a rejection of that which already exists, while offering
the promise of an evolving, ever-changing rhetoric.
In Rereading the Sophists, Susan Jarratt argues that the sophists reject
traditional religion as an explanation for natural phenomena [and] they
evinced a special interest in human perceptions as the only source of
knowledge in all fields […] and emphasized the significance of language in
constructing that knowledge. (xviii)
In line with this idea is Haraway’s contention that the cyborg has no “seductions
to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts
into a higher unity” and that the “cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense”
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(150). The strength of the cyborg stems from this resistance to an abstract ideal
of both absolute truth and its disconnect from the Western origin myth. Much like
the Sophists, the cyborg resists any reverence for past or current power systems
and works to dismantle such systems that act as siphons for social power.
For the purposes of my project, I draw upon Foucault’s idea of power,
because it provides the foundation for discussing the potential social power of the
cyborg. According to Foucault, power is everywhere:
not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under
its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment or
the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to
another. (History 93)
This net-like system of power that Foucault describes is where I want to position
the rhetoric of the cyborg. By adopting this view of omnipresent power and
understanding that the cyborg has no stake in this system, it is possible to see
the cyborg’s potential for subverting existing power systems and as a figure that
exists, paradoxically, despite those very systems.

The Foundation
An appropriate beginning for the discussion of this emerging cyborg
rhetoric is Friedrich Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense. This
work represents a major shift in the history of the idea of an absolute Truth in
terms of reality and human identity. Nietzsche suggests a kind of
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epiphenomenon as he describes the human will to distinguish and maintain one’s
self from others at the same time wishing to exist within the social and the herd
(1172). In this sense, truth does not exist in terms of Plato’s ideal forms but
rather stems from, as Nietzsche claims, a “legislation of language” (1172). The
shift here is important because it allows for an active construction of truth and
reality, a kind of truth based on a congress of ideas that relies heavily on the
user. This fundamental difference in thinking about truth and its relationship with
identity and the social allows for a less anthropocentric view of human nature and
insists that a more flexible ideal be accepted as a possibility. Nietzsche insists
that social reality, including truth and identity, exists as nothing more than a
created system, a system that suits the needs of the user.
The created system that arises out of this “legislation of language” is not
an isolated and closed system that operates independently. In fact, this system is
entirely dependent on what Mikhail Bakhtin might call an “informational feedbackloop” of varying ideological products. In Marxism and the Philosophy of
Language, Bakhtin claims that social interaction is essential to human
consciousness and, I would argue, the human experience as a whole. Where
Nietzsche is concerned with the construction of truth through language, Bakhtin
moves further and the concern becomes social interaction through the use of
signs to construct human consciousness. For Bakhtin, the truth created through
language that Nietzsche proposes is only possible through social interaction.
More importantly, this interaction is inherently a dialogic feedback-loop: a
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continual exchange that depends on the active participation of those involved.
This dependence is most obvious when we consider that Nietzsche’s created
system of social reality is a user created system which suits the needs of the
user: for the user by the user, if you will. Bakhtin’s claim that “a sign does not
simply exist as a part of reality—[that] it reflects and refracts another reality”
speaks to the participation required in order to maintain such a feedback-loop
(1211). In other words, human intelligence and consciousness can be viewed, in
a way, as the manipulation of signs and symbols. This manipulation takes place
in the scope of spoken language, images, and text with which we are constantly
in conversation every day.
Attempting to view human intelligence and consciousness as nothing
more than the signs and symbols of language may appear to be a drastic idea.
However, this idea becomes less drastic when viewed alongside a similarly
constructed technology: writing. In his 1986 essay, “Writing is a Technology that
Restructures Thought,” Walter Ong explores the transition from a society with an
oral tradition to one highly dependent on written texts; he argues that this
technology of writing has affected the way we think as well as how we view the
world around us. Ong acknowledges the difficulty we have viewing writing as a
technology. He claims “we have interiorized the technology of writing so deeply
that without tremendous effort we cannot separate it from ourselves or even
recognize its presence and influence” (19). In much the same way, the signs and
symbols of technology have become so ingrained and interiorized that the parts
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become almost incomprehensible without the larger context of the whole. Writing
is an artificial extension of consciousness, language, and intelligence, and
according to Ong, “artificiality is natural to human beings. Technology, properly
interiorized, does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances it” (24).
Ong outlines how writing has affected thought and consciousness, specifically
through separation and distance: knower from the known, interpretation from
data, word from sound, the source of communication from the recipient, past
from present, logic from rhetoric, etc. (24). In this sense, writing has restructured
how we think; it has actively shaped our consciousness.
A critique of the idea that consciousness is shaped by language or
technologies seems to stem in large part from the absoluteness and nonreciprocal nature of such a claim. For instance, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis,
which treats language in a similar way that Ong treats the technology of writing,
is widely criticized, as are Ong’s ideas, for being deterministic. Technological
determinism is the idea that technology has transformed our consciousness in a
non-reciprocal way, lacking input from the users of the technology. Andrew
Feenberg, for example, in “Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power and
Democracy” claims “determinism rests on the assumption that technologies have
an autonomous functional logic that can be explained without reference to
society” (3). Here we see the critique of the non-reciprocal nature of Ong’s
theory. The criticism seems to be that while Ong shows how technology may
have an effect on consciousness, he ignores how society changes a technology
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in turn. Ong’s argument about writing can be extended to current digital
technologies, specifically regarding the way in which technology has been
adopted and reciprocal connection we have with the cyborg.
There is no strict societal/technological separation when considering the
cyborg. The cyborg exists within the liminal state of society and technology,
neither entirely of one or the other. The fact that Ong chooses to focus on the
change undergone by the users of technology, as opposed to the change in
technology does not suggest the autonomous nature of technology that critics rail
against. In fact, the very nature of technology, its artificial nature, suggests the
very opposite: that technology is heavily shaped by society. Feenberg’s claim of
technological determinism ignores the intimate relationship of human and
technology that is the cyborg. While Ong’s focus on the technology of writing
and its impact on consciousness may appear deterministic, he never dismisses,
nor does he discuss, any social or human impact on technology itself.
Considering Ong’s idea regarding the ways in which our consciousness
can be constructed by and mediated through artificial technologies, I would like to
examine this evolving cyborg identity as the direct result of ever increasing digital
technologies. The ideas of Nietzsche, Bakhtin, and Ong provide a foundation for
considering digital forms of communication in the same way we might consider
the technology of writing. Where the artificial technology of writing has been the
preeminent technology involved in the construction of human consciousness and
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knowledge, now the increasing presence of digital, interconnected computerized
systems are at the forefront of influencing and shaping human thought.

The Cyborg’s Potential
Digital systems, especially the Internet, are the new technologies that
mediate our thoughts and consciousness. Moving away from the linear
separation and literal distance that writing provides, the digital realm of the
Internet allows for a less linear transfer of knowledge. To understand how
information is disseminated within the interconnected system of the Internet, and
the cyborg’s role, it may be helpful to look briefly at Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari’s concept of the rhizome. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and
Guattari describe the rhizome in terms of multiplicity and structure, or lack
thereof, and claim “a rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will
start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines” (10). To further this concept
of the rhizome Deleuze and Guattari explain that a rhizome is composed of
plateaus and that exist never in the beginning or the end (24). This suggests a
connection with the middle for the cyborg: no beginning, no end, but existence
nonetheless. Gordon Calleja and Christian Schwager echo a similar idea in
“Rhizomatic cyborgs…,” noting that the “organization of the World Wide Web
turns it into an instantiation of the concept of the rhizome whose defining
attributes bear a strong affinity with those inherent in the structure of the Web"
(7). Here we witness an essentially structureless structure that defies that which
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is linear: no left to right (or right to left), no requirement to read from first page to
last. The “rhizome has neither beginning nor end,” lacks subject and object, and
“connects any point to any other point” (23). The Internet provides just such a
system without a defined subject, without a defined object, and not restricted to
any linear progression. As an entity, the Internet has no predetermined entrance,
no particular path to any particular destination; it is the rhizome.
While structurelessness may be a technical misnomer when referring to
the Web, due to the underlying code and intentional specifications, for most
users, these inner workings are of little concern. For instance, many users learn
to navigate the Internet through the use of domain names or website addresses.
However, these addresses are technically for ease of use. Each website is
actually linked to an IP address assigned to a particular server, and some sites
such as Google and Wikipedia have many IP addresses since they operate
across multiple servers. Even a complex action such as connecting one
computer to an external server becomes so commonplace to a user that the
mechanics and technology behind that action become secondary and
insignificant. We, in some way, want to interact with our technology in a familiar
manner, one which we are used to and that mirrors personal interaction with
other humans.
Calleja and Schwager, who touch on the reason our interaction with
technology becomes essentially effortless, claim that “[t]he interiorization of an
essentially non-linear technology brings with it a cognitive reconfiguration” (8).
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This claim echoes Ong; restructuring thought and interiorizing the new
technology of writing is essential to Walter Ong’s “Writing is a Technology…”.
Within a digital age, thought, consciousness, and knowledge must be resituated,
reconfigured, and reevaluated as the linear transfer of knowledge becomes
increasingly less compatible in navigating the vast, highly interconnected digital
consciousness that constructs the Internet.
It is exactly this non-linear, layered way of thinking with which the cyborg
figure is concerned. To define fully the mechanics and boundaries of a cyborg
rhetoric, computerized systems and digital technologies would have to be fully
interiorized; however, the evolving technology behind the Internet is in its infancy
and still evolving. Nevertheless, the strategies, tools, and reasoning behind a
cyborg rhetoric can be examined.
Cyborg rhetoric resists established boundaries and binaries, as N.
Katherine Hayles writes in How We Became Posthuman. The dialogic feedbackloop that has been established as a result of homeostasis has, according to
Hayles, led to a more subversive idea of reflexivity. Hayles defines reflexivity as
“the movement whereby that which has been used to generate a system is
made, through a changed perspective, to become part of the system it
generates” (8; emphasis in original). This concept of reflexivity “confuses and
entangles the boundaries we impose on the world in order to make sense of that
world” (Hayles 8-9). An implication of this confusion is that if a boundary or
binary is constructed, the reflexive nature of this new cyborg rhetoric “tends
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notoriously toward infinite regress” (Hayles 9). For instance, as technology
advances it tends to retain aspects of its predecessors; it remains, in a way,
connected to what came before it. A simple example appears in word processing
software or an email client. Take the “save” icon in word processing or the
“attachment” icon in an email client. The icon to save a document is a diskette
and the icon to attach a document is a paperclip. Both of these examples
demonstrate the need for technology to remain familiar and reach back to
previously established ideas even in the face of a changing technology. So, too,
does the rhetoric of the cyborg reach back constantly to established boundaries
and binaries, and are in perpetual disruption leaving them unstable and unable to
ever become permanent fixtures. Just as the Sophists rejected an absolute truth,
the cyborg in a similar way rejects any permanent position or role in an everevolving rhetoric.
My next chapter will provide an analysis of how cyborg’s disruption of
traditional nodes of social power is possible using Foucault’s ideas on knowledge
and power. Foucault claims “that there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (Discipline 27). It is
the reflexive nature of power that I wish to explore through the figure of the
cyborg. Here it will be possible to see the cyborg’s potential to “disrupt the
circuit, [and cause] the ‘perfect communication’ to crash” (Ballif 64).
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CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNANCE

The posthuman condition resituates the human condition and allows for a
larger conceptualization of what our existence means in relation to our traditional
concept of humanity. Rosi Braidotti, in The Posthuman, suggests that the role of
critical theorists should be “to provide adequate representations of our situated
historical location [and aim to] produce socially relevant knowledge” (4). The
cyborg in this context allows users to assume the role of critical theorists and
allows for a much less guarded production of knowledge. This production of
knowledge fueled by the cyborg becomes increasingly heterogeneous and
socially relevant due to the increase in digital connectivity.
The cyborg in a posthuman world exists digitally and relies on the
increasing interconnectedness that manifests itself more and more in daily life.
With this reliance comes the question of how the cyborg exists: if the cyborg is a
combination of organic and non-organic then users of this digital technology
collectively make up and contribute to the identity of the cyborg, how are the
tensions of order and autonomy balanced? Power in its simplest sense can be
understood in terms of governance: power over one group or another. Can the
cyborg be governed, while governing? Is the cyborg’s governance governed?
This question of governance is important, as it is, for the most part, the sole
means by which societies understand power. There are other measures of
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power (money, fame, and social status being the most obvious), but with these
measures often come some type of governing influence which is then exercised
as a controlling power. To gain insight into how the cyborg can succeed in
performing governance, I wish to look at some particular means of governance
and their relation to the cyborg’s digital existence.
Working with the writings of La Mothe Le Vayer, Foucault draws out three
particular forms of government: “the art of self-government, connected with
morality; the art of properly governing a family, which belongs to economy; and,
finally, the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics” (Power 206).
These old conceptions of power exist today and can be seen in the digital spaces
that are now commonplace. If we find correlations to these types of government
on the web (political, economic, and moral concerns, for example) we can begin
to see how online communities govern themselves without the need for
intervention from some Machiavellian prince.
Foucault distinguishes between upward and downward continuity,
claiming upward continuity comes from the governed’s understanding of how to
govern themselves and that downward continuity comes from the governed being
governed by a well-run state (Power 207). However, if we are to assume that
there is no governing prince in the case of the cyborg’s digital realm, we can say
that there is no downward continuity, and therefore the cyborg seeks sovereignty:
the cyborg is its own sovereign authority. Foucault claims an end to sovereignty
while maintaining finality in a system governed by laws rather than a sovereign

15

(Power 211); however, the cyborg embraces sovereignty while neglecting finality.
In other words, Foucault’s ideas suggest law as a governing force in itself; no
one is above the law. The cyborg’s claim here, however, asserts an evolving set
of laws with nothing being absolute. Finality, in this sense, can be understood as
permanent under an authority and the law. In the case of the cyborg, sovereignty
does not stem from laws, but rather from a similar place like that of a sovereign
(a general common good). However, cyborg sovereignty lacks the finality
implicitly granted to such a figure. Consider that no one person controls the
content of the internet, yet there is a basic structure that is followed. This
structure, however, can and always will be abandoned by the ever-evolving
figure of the cyborg unable to embrace finality in any sense.
For Foucault, any people wishing to resist subjugation must engage in
some form of struggle against that subjugating power (Power 331). For the
cyborg, the struggle is different. And if this discussion is ultimately a about
power, specifically the potential power of the cyborg, it is necessary to determine
what the ultimate struggle is. Foucault seems to echo the goal of the cyborg
here: He says of the objective of any struggle that it “is to attack not so much
such-or-such institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a
technique, a form of power” (331). In this case then, the struggle itself is not
against traditional power systems, but instead an attempt at equalization—a
struggle for power itself. This difference is worth drawing on considering the
potential this idea has for the cyborg figure. Consider some of the major
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revolutions or movements of the past: the Arab Spring, the civil rights movement,
or the women’s liberation movement. Rarely was the struggle against something
or someone, but rather it was for something: freedom from some sort of
oppression in the previous examples. Just think how successful the “war against
drugs”, “the war on terrorism”, or “the fight against communism” has been.
These are all wars that have been continuous and ongoing failures which rely on
the notion of a defined opposition, an opposition which believes it, too,
possesses moral superiority. A struggle for something has no defined
opposition; there is no other to be defeated, but rather something to be attained.
The distinction becomes even clearer when considered with the two definitions of
“subject” which Foucault points out: “subject to someone else by control and
dependence and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge”
(Power 331). A struggle for suggests the latter, whereas the struggle against
seems to indicate control by some outside power not connected intimately with
the self. For the cyborg, power manifests itself through the lack of control by an
outside power. The cyborg’s gaze is upon itself.

The Online Panopticon
“The gaze is alert everywhere” (Foucault, Discipline 195). For Foucault,
this alertness referred to sentinels and guards moving from house to house and
maintaining a presence in the streets. For the idea of the cyborg, however, this
alertness refers to our own gaze as it exists in any online space. This online
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gaze is enacted through our own participation, through online web crawlers
bookmarking content, through website moderators, and through increasingly
physical government entities. Monitoring, or gazing upon, such vast digital
expanse seems impossible. However, what this difficulty in monitoring means for
the participants is that, essentially, a form of mob morality wins out. Anything
straying from the general consensus is considered deviant, So certain principles
and rules of conduct are imposed not only within any actual terms of service
agreement (which, for the most part, users remain blissfully ignorant of), but by
the consensus of the users themselves. Users no longer exist as, in Foucault’s
words, “docile bodies” to be governed and managed, but rather as the governing
force of one another and the digital spaces they populate. Here we see the
example of upward continuity in users understanding how to govern themselves
without the need for a Machiavellian prince. In fact, without users, participants,
online digital space is nothing more than a void on webhosting server. Just as a
school without a student body ceases to exist as a school, less frequented
spaces online cease to exist in any meaningful way.
While we as users watch ourselves, most do so under the ever-thinning
cloak of anonymity. This potential lack of anonymity may be threatening to
some, however, if technology is to be a primary space for educational, economic,
and government engagement; users cannot expect any level of privacy different
from that of the physical world. The benefits of online technologies should be
weighed carefully with concerns regarding privacy. Surveillance, after all, is
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inherently unavoidable in online spaces. The permanence of texts, especially
digital texts hosted on redundant server space, leaves any hope of anonymity or
pure privacy a laughable notion. After all, it is not that a user’s information is
being viewed that matters, but rather what is done with that information. We as
users are all subject to digital surveillance as participants, whether we are aware
of said surveillance or not, which is just as Foucault suggests it must be:
And, in order to be exercised, this power had to be given the
instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance,
capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain
invisible. (Discipline 214)
This is precisely the manner in which any type of surveillance works in our ever
more familiar online world.
Save files, data caches, backups, and copies all offer a sense of
permanence to most types of online data. Online surveillance is inherently
exhaustive as the very nature of data on the Internet, in forms of conversation;
forums, posts, blogs, tweets, etc. render any form of discretion and precision
nearly impossible. All information created and developed with online digital
technologies potentially exists forever; omnipresent, indeed. The invisible nature
of our watchers, however, is slightly skewed as the extent to which we know who
watches seems to stop at entities rather than people. In other words, Company X
sold your personal information, not John Schmidt at Company X. These entities,
though, are comprised of the very same users who are being watched: in
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essence, the watched are the watchers as well. Now this idea might seem a
convoluted one, but the fact that the line between watched and watcher is so
blurred is the exact reason, the very reason, the online panopticon is so effective.
User data is collected on a massive scale by social media and news sites, but
the user tends to provide valuable information freely and openly. Facebook
founder Mark Zuckerberg, in a 2007 interview, commented on collecting user
data in this way, “The question isn’t, ‘What do we want to know about people?’,
It’s, ‘What do people want to tell about themselves?’” (Zuckerberg, Rose).
Facebook is the quintessential panoptical model: the surveillance here is passive
and entirely dependent on user participation. There is no covert data mining, but
rather an agreement between the user and the entity. This agreement is often
ignored by the user, but it is an agreement nonetheless. What does this mean
for our cyborg identity in online spaces? It demonstrates the increasingly casual,
yet complex, relationship that we have with online technologies and the extent to
which we are willing to provide information about ourselves without hesitation.
This model of power cultivates a unique inverse power relationship online
in that no power exists unless it is freely given. This power relationship is unique
when viewed alongside Foucault’s notion of what power actually is and what
power is supposed to do:
[Power] is a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it induces,
it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives,
makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or
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forbids absolutely, but it is always a way of acting upon one or more
acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A
set of actions upon other actions. (Power 341)
The Facebook example of power does, indeed, follow Foucault’s basic outline,
but it is the users who hold the actual power. It is the user who acts upon
Facebook’s actions, the user who has the power to forbid absolutely. If, for
instance, Facebook changes a particular privacy setting, or interface, it is the
user base who has the ultimate end option, deleting their Facebook account.
There exists no ultimate action that can be enacted upon a Facebook user,
however. As willing non-captive participants, the users of Facebook hold the real
power, and the onus is on Facebook to maintain that willingness of its users.
While the gaze of Facebook may be extensive, it does not inherently
translate to any form of real power. In fact, even Facebook’s identity is
constituted by its users (an identity owed in large part to the accessibility of the
service). Whether it is accessed on a smart phone, tablet, smart TV, or via a
computer, Facebook is extremely simple and easy to use. This simplicity
combats, for the most part, what is known as the digital divide: unequal access to
various technologies on the part of the user. To combat this divide, however,
Facebook must compromise its technology in the sense that it must cater to the
lowest common denominator in terms of literacy level and technology (not that
this limiting of technology is in any way a bad thing for Facebook’s purpose). The
concept, however, of catering to the lowest common technological denominator
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for the sake of increasing access has two specific negative implications. First, it
limits the overall experience, and second, it restricts any significant growth in the
technology or a user’s overall understanding of a technology.
Indeed, it may be the case that technology, rather than being limited, is
actually being filtered and certain technologies are ignored. Certain less practical
technologies for large groups, for instance, are not employed due to simple
logistics and manageability. As we increasingly depend on technology for
education, entertainment, and social interaction, what effect does limiting the
technology for the sake of access have on the experience? To what extent do
we inhibit our cyborg identity? In my next chapter, these issues of access,
governance, power, and self-limiting practices are issues I will attempt to address
in the context of a kind of digitally situated pedagogy that should be fully
embraced in our current digital age.
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CHAPTER THREE
CYBORG STRATEGIES

In chapter three, I examine the pedagogical implications of this emerging
cyborg rhetoric. Building on the work of my previous chapters, I plan to examine
how cyborg rhetoric is, or could be, manifested in learning environments.
Through this examination of digital learning communities, I will highlight the ways
in which cyborg rhetoric acts a subversive force that seeks to alter traditional
systems of power. Paula Freire in Pedagogy of Freedom states:
The great challenge for the democratic-minded educator is how to
transmit a sense of limit that can be ethically integrated by freedom
itself. The more consciously freedom assumes its necessary limits,
the more authority it has, ethically speaking, to continue to struggle
in its own name. (96)
For whom does the cyborg struggle then? The cyborg is decentralized in its
struggle and can act in the interest of all users. This decentralized approach
allows for an open pedagogy that promotes critical thinking, creation of
knowledge rather than simple transmission, and an aversion to finality
concerning learning and knowledge. The cyborg’s authority here, in terms of
pedagogy, results from its own freedom and openness: its willingness to evolve.
A digitally situated pedagogy must evolve to maintain the various connections
that are necessary and always evolving as well. Not only do technologies
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constantly change, but also the communities in which these technologies are
employed change.
Online social communities vary in the ways that they are manifested,
usually owing their identity as a site to the more real and tangible attributes of
those who contribute to, and exist within, the larger community. Facebook,
Reddit, 4Chan, and Wikipedia, for instance, are all vastly different sites, each
with a vastly different user base, yet each serving the same basic functions:
sharing, discussing, communicating, etc. Learning communities that incorporate
online spaces and digital technologies should strive for identity in the same way
as online social communities. Without an identity, an online learning space
becomes a template with no regard for particular strategies, learning
communities, or distinct pedagogical approaches. The question of usefulness for
the purposes of education, however, seems to be an ongoing debate. Before
addressing some of these concerns, I would like to highlight a previous critique of
online technology that proved to be shortsighted. This will set the stage for
discussing the current state of digital technologies and the role of the cyborg
plays in the current digital climate.
In 1995, Newsweek published the article “Why the Web Won’t Be Nirvana”
in which author Clifford Stoll outlines the various reasons why the Web falls short
in shaping future human interaction. Stoll writes
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I’m uneasy about this most trendy and oversold community. Visionaries
see a future of telecommuting workers, interactive libraries and multimedia
classrooms.
While this is easily dismissed, the point is simply that early technologies can
easily be criticized and its potential can be unrealized. Certainly, this community
is more than a passing trend and the multimedia classroom has evolved beyond
a classroom with walls at all, moving ever-closer to online education as an
alternative to the traditional classroom. This fact, however, was unknown to Stoll
in 1995, but his critique seems almost comical in the current day as he continues
his condemnation of online technologies with the insistence that “What the
Internet hucksters won’t tell you is that the Internet is one big ocean of unedited
data, without any pretense of completeness…the Internet has become a
wasteland of unfiltered data” (Stoll). While his lack of foresight can be forgiven,
his flawed assumptions cannot be ignored. One of the very simple, yet
important, tenets of online technologies gets blasted by Stoll as he comments on
users ability to generate content and post for audiences to see. Stoll provides
this misguided interpretation, “Everyone can be heard cheaply and instantly” and
“[w]hen most everyone shouts, few listen” (Stoll). Stoll’s sentiment here seems
to privilege order over some imagined form of chaos; however, existing in this
imagined chaos is exactly what makes users more cyborg than not. Cyborg
identity ceases to be about the technology used, but rather the extent to which
users integrate themselves with a given technology to cultivate a new and
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innovative discourse that depends on the very shouting Stoll condemns. While
Stoll’s arguments can be dismissed today, there are still many concerns about
the effect of digital learning spaces on students. These concerns involve the
mediated interaction of online spaces vs. face-to-face interaction, issues of
technological access, and student learning.
Online spaces depend on an oversaturation of voices; this potential chaos
is where the cyborg strives and is what allows for endless potential in digital
spaces. Education, for instance, has become increasingly connected to, even
dependent on, online technologies. With the ever-increasing demand for access
to education, and the increasing cost, online technologies will be increasingly
used to accommodate a myriad of student needs. In terms of cost, for instance,
William Bowen, in Higher Education in the Digital Age, references a 2012 College
Board report which states that tuition rates have, over the thirty-year period
between 1982 and 2013, increased an average of 257% (19). This rise in cost
coupled with increased demand has led to the inception of the Massive Open
Online Course, or MOOC, as a means to “teach” thousands of students per
class. Susan Meisenhelder, in “MOOC Mania”, comments that the MOOCs are
mostly “’talking head’ or ‘sage on the state’ lecture videos” and because of the
size “professors do not interact with student either to encourage them, to add
insights, or even to tell them they are on the wrong track” (7). Meisenhelder
explains that the appeal of the MOOC comes from promises of access and
affordability for low-income and working-class students (9). Meisenhelder points
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out that any faculty member teaching a traditional face-to-face course with the
same characteristics of the MOOC could “expect the harshest criticism…for his
or her retrograde pedagogy, inadequate assessment of student learning, and
dismal failure to foster student success” (8). So, while employing technology, the
MOOC does so in way that simply compounds and continues poor pedagogical
approaches.
The MOOC is inherently anti-cyborg, however, due to the means in which
online technology is employed. The MOOC, by its very design, is anti-chaos; it is
over structured to such an extent that online technologies are reduced to nothing
more than delivery systems, e.g. videos, slide shows, lecture notes, transcripts,
and message boards. In short, the MOOC’s superficial use of technology
ignores the potential for meaningful integration of technology that enhances
human interaction. The sheer scale of the MOOC is another obvious defect.
Massive is the unique distinction that sets the MOOC apart from a number of
other open online courses offered by online sources from YouTube to MIT. Even
the Massive qualifier has a somewhat negative connotation that conjures images
of instability and unsustainable growth. The MOOC model, with its 1000:1
student teacher ratio, can in no way afford students an effective educational
experience, just as a single arrow shot will have no effect on brick wall. And, as
is the case with the limiting of technology by Facebook, the MOOC by its very
nature must operate within the lowest common technological denominator to
teach the thousands of students it claims to be able to reach.
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The Digital Divide and Access
Traditionally, the digital divide has been discussed simply in terms of
varying levels of access to digital technologies by different groups. Initially, this
divide was viewed at a simplistic have vs. have not level; however as digital
technologies have become more commonplace, there seems to have been a
move to accept that the inequality of access is the issue rather than simply
access vs. no access. In a 2008 article, “Exploring the Gap of the Digital Divide”
Stale Rye addresses both of these viewpoints. Rye first mentions the traditional
concept of bridging that hopes “that the underprivileged [without access] can join
the privileged [with the benefits of access]” (73). This traditional model of the
digital divide, however, is impractical and unrealistic given the social and
socioeconomic disparities that are a reality across communities, counties, states,
and even countries. Rye next addresses the concept that should seem the
logical and, in my mind, inescapable, attitude towards this digital divide: that
access and technology should be viewed as a continuum where access and
quality of access vary greatly (73). This model of the divide is a practical,
realistic acceptance that I wish to work under. The underlying reasons behind
these variations are due in large part to variations in socioeconomic status,
education, and even geographical placement. The fact is that these differences
do exist and are the root cause of the misinformed pedagogical position of
MOOCs.
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Given the differences in quality of access, the only way the MOOC works
is to ignore this divide and exist in a perpetual retreat, in the lowest common
technological denominator. The MOOC adopts a traditional top-down
pedagogical model and uses technology simply for dissemination of information.
This top-down approach is no different from using a bullhorn to reach a large
audience. In fact, this bullhorn approach works counter to the upward continuity
approach of the self-governing discussed earlier. What the MOOC does, in
terms of the cyborg, is stifle and restrict potential. The MOOC provides
connectivity based access to a large number of students; however, what it
neglects to do is provide any of the benefits of a truly digitally situated pedagogy.
Access should be considered in terms of not only connectivity, but also
level of technology. The very best connectivity means very little if an attempted
digital pedagogy is simply text-based, for instance. The use, or under use, of a
particular technology has to be considered with the same weight as the level of
technology itself. A pedagogy that simply reproduces a traditional classroom
model, but employs technology, is counterproductive in terms of addressing the
digital divide. In part, the digital divide can be viewed as less of a technological
divide and more in terms of some of the broader social issues that affect quality
of access. Without a certain degree of technological literacy users will be unable
to effectively use technology in a truly beneficial way. In fact, in “Digital Divide
Across Borders” researchers point out this very fact and note that “mere access
to a computer or the Internet does not imply that people actually can or will make
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effective use of it” (Notten et al. 552). So, in essence it is not the technology that
is key in a digitally situated pedagogy, so much as it is how the technology is
used in a way that enhances a student’s learning experience. What can
technology do that was previously not possible?
Mark Zuckerberg, with Facebook, connects billions of users through ease
of use, cross-platform compatibility, and a limited, just enough technology model.
The MOOC can reach thousands of students per course through ease of use,
cross platform compatibility, and a limited, just enough model. This increase in
activity and access is, as previously mentioned, the bullhorn approach. A welldeveloped digitally situated pedagogy should be less about an increase in
audience and more about how particular technologies can be used to enhance
student learning in new and innovative ways. In my next section I will propose
some tenets of an effective digitally situated pedagogy and contrast these tenets
with the current top down educational model that technology is currently being
used to perpetuate.

Digitally Situated Pedagogy
Just as with traditional pedagogical approaches, a digital pedagogy should
be about effective teaching and student learning. An online course, for instance,
is not good simply because it is online in the same way a face-to-face course is
not good simply because it is traditional. There can, and always will be, terrible
courses whether online or face-to-face. The idea here is to consider what an
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effective course does and how technology can enhance that effectiveness. A
lateral move of traditionally bad in-class practices to an online digital space (as is
the case with the MOOC) makes no sense in terms of improving either student
learning or pedagogy. The move towards increased digital technologies in the
classroom remains an unavoidable fact and to best take advantage of these
digital technologies we must consider some of the best ways to use technology
and move from the bullhorn approach of the MOOC.
The underlying approach when using technology in the classroom should
be not to privilege technology over pedagogy; in other words, technology should
not be used simply for the sake of using technology. The most ubiquitous digital
tool in online and traditional face-to-face courses is a common management
system, or CMS, such as Blackboard and Moodle. These tools act as the
interface for a course providing access to grades, assignments, discussion and
message boards, and any number of other tools available to faculty and student.
A CMS system provides a foundation for a well-designed student centered
course, although conversely provides the same foundation for the flawed teacher
centered approach of the MOOC. However, as I mentioned, it should be
pedagogy over technology and how the technology is used to enhance a course.
The obvious benefit of the using digital online technologies is the
traditional concept of distance learning, which is the exact rationale for the
MOOC. However, to compensate for this distance the MOOC simply yells louder.
To compensate for this benefit of distance a truly digital situated pedagogy
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should aim to recreate much of the lost interaction between students and
instructor; one of the benefits of a face-to-face classroom. David J. Staley
suggests, in a chapter in Teaching the Humanities Online, however, that the
traditional embodied classroom approach should not be privileged over the
seemingly disembodied approach that online teaching provides. Staley
comments that:
Young people inhabit two worlds: a physical world and a virtual
networked world [and that] virtual, disembodied interactions and
experiences are as real to these students and as valued as their
embodied, face-to-face relationships. (161-162)
For many students, a disembodied digital existence supplements their own
embodied existence in a very real way. This fact indicates that online
interactions would be as meaningful to them as traditional in class interactions. I
think the key here is interaction and what technology is does to enhance this
interaction.
An online course employing various digital technologies has the potential
to afford students many options not always possible in the traditional classroom.
The fact that learning can be asynchronous or synchronous in a virtual classroom
provides much more flexibility for instructors and students. In fact, the options
afforded to both student and teacher are discussed by Merry Rendahl in “It’s Not
The Matrix: Thinking about Online Writing Instruction”. The essay describes the
combinations of certain factors that are possible with online education. These
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interactions are discussed in terms of time, interaction, and space. First, “time
can be synchronous, asynchronous, or diachronic (developing over time)”.
Second, “learning space can be co-located or separated”. And third,
“interactions can be described as unmediated, necessarily mediated, or
optionally mediated”. The idea behind these types of interactions and
connections, according to Rendahl, is the mitigation of distance that must be
addressed in both online and traditional classes (146).
Mitigating distance can also be viewed in the context of assignments that
incorporate students’ increased natural interaction with digital technologies.
Jonathon Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes in On Multimodality note the
“importance of paying attention to student literacy practices” (39) when
considering discourse in composition classrooms. For students, this means
being allowed to incorporate their own kind of technological literacies without
privileging traditional rhetorical practices. Alexander and Rhodes continue this
idea with the assertion that “we shouldn’t apply older notions of literacy to the
new technologies” (42). They also echo my contention that technology should
not be used simply for the sake of technology in state that technology should
“explore what those new technologies offer us by way of an expanded notion of
rhetorical practice and engagement with different discourses” (42). So, to what
extent does using digital technologies in the classroom move us away from
traditional literacy practices and enhance our ability to cultivate the alternative
rhetorical practices of our students? Knowledge production changes as the
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means of production changes. A critical analysis of a text, for instance, would
look vastly different whether initiated in the form of a traditional essay or via
collaborative Twitter posts. This URL
(https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1Qj1g9NpAtjzuL_ypmn6l_yeF8WSrK7YDaLAHI
Xw44Tk/edit), for instance, means little in a traditional essay format; however,
embedded in a web page, it allows the writer to direct readers to more
information. Ultimately, the way information can be produced, presented, and
played with becomes increasingly varied and important when attempting to
integrate new literacy practices with new technologies.

Conclusion
According to Chris Hables Gray:
Knowledge is power. To be empowered, the cyborg citizen has to
have the specific information that govern our technical and political
situation, and we need to understand information, theory which lays
out the limits of knowledge…. Knowledge as power moves from
the specific to the general and back again. (198-199)
For the cyborg and a functional digitally situated pedagogy to succeed we must
consider this movement of power as knowledge. As technological progress is
made and particular knowledge becomes less powerful, we must continue to
adapt emerging technologies in ways that will allow students to remain active
producers of knowledge in and outside the classroom. We must not simply use
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new technologies for the sake of using new technologies. Trends and
educational fads must be avoided. A true digital pedagogy should employ
technology in ways that enhance student learning and advocate for studentcentered approaches in the classroom. Where technology is superfluous, it
should be dismissed. Where it enhances, it should be embraced. The thirdsophistic, the cyborg, works best to advance pedagogy when concerned with
progress rather than finding a footing in a historical context. The cyborg does not
seek to make a name for itself, but instead to further pedagogical progress. As
we move beyond everything that is current, we must not be caught up with the
difficulties of the new and the issues of the past and refuse progress for the sake
of nostalgia.
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